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Fear is a potent political resource that is at once an expression of vulnerability to geopolitical threats and a
rationale for security measures against them. It is produced through tropes of nationalism rooted in economic
marginalization, loss of territory and anxieties about invasions of home. Such anxieties give rise to the secr,rri-
tizatimt of fear used to underwrite the allocation of resources to fortify borders and manage risk. The securitization
of fear and its geopolitical uses and abuses in the context of disaster, conflict, and human displacement demand
further attention. This article examines two expressions of fear that have signiffcant implications for broader
research agendas in political geography. First, in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, the implementation of "buffer zones," or
no-build setback areas along the affected coastlines after the tsunami vividly illustrates how efforts to enhance
public safety can stir Gelings of discrimination, terxion, and fear. Humanitarian remedies that are not cautiously
conflict-sensitive can unwittingly generate fear and mistrust. Second, the politics of fear intersect with the
provision of intemational aid, which is increasingly premised on vulnerabiliry "at home" in donor countries to
make it politically relevant. Once created, such crises are offset by aid to locations that represent geopolitical
threats. Unraveling the ways in which Gar is produced and framed to justifii violence, exclusion, and hatred is a
pressing political and intellectual task within geography. Key Vords: aid, fear, natiarwlism, Sri Lanlq, tsunarni.
he tsunami of 76 December 7004 led to extra-
ordinary devastation and destruction for people
of the Indian Ocean Basin region. Aid from
overseas was unprecedented; more than $t: billion was
pledged, with $5 billion coming from private individuals
and companies (The Economist 2005).1 Several of the
states affected by the $unami had been host to long-
term conflicts before the disaster, raising the question of
what impact the tsunami and related reconstruction aid
might have on conflict (L. Billon and 'Waizenegger
7.006). More than two years later, the results are mixed.
In Aceh, the Indonesian Government signed a peace
agreement with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in
August 7005 that was still holding early in 2007. In Sri
Lanka, developments since the munami have intensified
the country's prolonged political crisis (Uyangoda 2005).
Government responses to the tsunami and the politics of
aid distribution generated feelings of discrimination and
mistrust arnong Muslim and Tamil communities, which
were hardest hit. Although not directly attributable ro
the tsunami, conflict between the rebel Liberation Tigers
of Thmil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri
Lanka (GoSL) has escalated, resulting in the resumption
of war. I
Responses to the tsunami have not taken place in a
political vacuum. In Sri Lanka, "Struggles over in-
terethnic justice, neoliberalism, economic distribudon,
the disempowerment of women, caste bigotry and such
have shaped the [Sri] Lankan political landscape in
significant ways over the last decades . . . even the tsu-
nami cannot wipe out the imprint of these fault lines"
(Nesiah, Nanthikesan, and Kadirgamar 2005). The
devastation of the tsunami and the geographies of aid
that followed overlay long-standing geopolitical tensions
and political geographies of displacement (Hyndman and
de Alwis 2004; Nah and Bunnell 2005). People displaced
by the war in Sri Lanka, for example, were displaced
again by the $unami. Exacerbating this situation, many
international nongovernmental organizations neglected
to consult their national and local counterparrs in the
irnmediate aftermath of the tsunami (Couldrey and
Morris 70A5; Institute for Policy Studies 2005).
I examine the politics of fear and vulnerability in posr-
tsunami Sri Lanka as part of a larger projecr in political
geography to unravel the producdon of fear and its
political corollaries. I do so in two parts. First, I trace
geographies of fear and enmity within Sri Lanka gener-
ated in the aftermath of the tsunami through the gov-
ernment's policy of buffer zones, or no-build zones,
established early in 2005. This geography of fear also has
a transnational dimension, traversing international
borders as well as different nations within Sri Lanka.
Second, extending this analysis, I demonstrate that in-
ternational aid is closely linked to geopolitical fears that
traverse intemational boundaries. Both buffer zones and
international aid use fear to rationalize their imple-
mentation and unwittingly produce anxiery and conflict
in their wake.
The use of extraordinary measures to secure borders
against geopolitical threats, such as unwanted migrants,
is not particularly new (Mongia 1999). The production
of crises, including the fear and xenophobia they instill,
remains a pressing concern because they legitimate
grounds for exceptional interventions (Agamben 1998;
Mountz 2004). States produce crisis and fear to obtain
consent for securitization measures. Probing the ways in
which fear is made and used in contexts of disaster and
aid is crucial to contesting the violence, exclusion, and
hatred they produce.
The Production of Fear
Sleepless in the early hours, you make a nest out of your
own fears-there must have been survival advantage in
dreaming up bad outcomes and scheming to avoid them.
This trick of dark imagining is one legacy of natural se-
lection in a dangerous world.
-lan McEwan, Saturdoy, 2005
The expansion of fear also comes from geopolitical fear-
mongering and intense conflicm from Darfur to lraq. It
comes from our growing apprehensions about inequality,
social injustice and political instabiliry across the globe.
. . . Fear plays many roles in consolidating the nation and in
legitimating govemment actions.
-Victoria Lawson, 
"Natural Disaster or Space of Vulner-
abiliry," 2005
The tsunami of late 7004 generated an unprece-
dented global outpouring of aid that raises interesting
geographical questions as to why people cared to give so
much to tsunami relief in comparison to other kinds of
humanitarian emergencies. Fear is one explanation for
this philanthropic impulse given the stark witnessing of
"white death" that occurred on television screens
worldwide (Olds, Sidaway, and Sparke 7005). Just as
"our deaths" 
"pp.ar to matter more than "their deaths"in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hyndman 2007), the valence
of "white death" was greater than indigenous death after
the tsunami. Media coverage of the victims and suf-
vivors of the tsunami, many of them Euro-American
tourists, generated a frightened sentiment among audi-
ences in the global North that "it could have been me."
Although this fear of the $unami is geographically
selective and racially skewed, it was transposed into a
hopeful if charitably unequal moment of unprecedented
philanthropy (Jeganathan 7005). The tsunami created a
space of exceptionalism and crisis: blameless victims
captured on camera stirred fear in those who witnessed
the devastation. Yet, in comparison, the destruction and
loss of life from the immense earthquake that struck
Pakistan in 7005 hardly registered among private donors
of the global North (Grundy-'Warr and Sidaway 7006).
Making Nationalism
The production of fear can be traced to the rise of
nationalisms. Vulnerability cultivates fear, sometimes for
political purposes. Fear has been incited through srra-
tegic tropes of nationalism that stir feelings of threat
and potential loss, as then-serbian-President Slobodan
Milosevic so successfully managed in his 1989 speeches
about Kosovo, a historical Serbian homeland allegedly
taken over by ethnic Albanians (Glenny L997). In so
doing, he sowed the seeds for his plan to ethnically
cleanse the province of Kosovo of ethnic Albanians a
decade later. Militarized Serbian nationalism also con-
fronted Croatian nationalism when Croatian leaders
followed Slovenia's lead in I99I, declaring indepen-
dence from Belgrade and the country of Yugoslavia, but
claiming territory that was home to many Serbs. The
subsequent conflict in Croatia and Bosnia from L997 to
1995 was a war of competing nationalisms over territory
and people in which fear was used to fuel hatred and
violence. The destructive power of nationalism was most
evident in Bosnia.Herzetrovina, a fledgling state strug-
gling for existence against the wishes of Belgrade and its
remnants of Yugoslavia (6 f"athail 7006).
In Sri Lanka, nationalism incites fear among Thmil,
Muslim, and Sinhala ethno-national groups. The fram-
ing of conflict has been predicated primarily on opposi-
tional tropes of Thmil-Sinhala relarions, but ar differenr
times the Sri Lankan Muslims have been allies to each
side. School textbook representations of Sinhala rulers in
relation to their Tamil opponents, for example, subscribe
to a fairly obvious state-sponsored Sinhala nationalism as
part of the national curriculum (Siriwardene et al. L9BZ) .
In a subsequent analysis of school texts, de Alwis (1998)
challenges the "us-them" binaries behind these chau-
vinistic stories, and yet notes their importance in in-
culcating children with specific imaginaries of nation.
She demonstrates that tales of military vulnerability
generate f.ar, followed by sentiments of courage and
victory in the name of the nation. These nation-
alisms have becorne vehemently militarized and per-
ceived as "ethnic" hatred, despite more subtle historical
geographies of fear, \(rhere marginaluation, exclusion, and
related vulnerability produce fear, violence is one response.
The production of nationalism in Sri Lanka is also
linked to World Bank-induced reforms to liberalize the
economy in L977 (Hyndman 2003). Before 1977, state
socialism allowed the government to funnel funds to
specific groups, making concessions especially to the
Sinhalese rural middle and lower classes in order to be
returned to power (Stokke 1998). After independence
from Britain in 1948, political power was organized a.c-
cording to class more than to national identity or eth-
nicity (Jayawardena 1990). Neoliberal economic policies
signaled the end of the concessions that had held ethnic
and class alliances together. Private investment began to
flourish among some groups despite the conflict, but
Tamil areas in Sri Lanka's Northeast and Sinhala areas
in the rural South remain largely excluded from this
prosperity (Sivanandan 1990).
In this context, economic marginalization produced
fear and uprising arnong two groups excluded from the
spoils of prosperity under a new neoliberal regime. The
first was comprised of Sinhala youth from rural agricul-
tural and middle classes who later formed the JVP
(People's Liberation Front), and the second was made
up of a cadre of Sri Lankan Thmils, namely the Tamil
Tigers, who armed themselves against the government
(Gunasinghe 1987). Both groups used militarized rro-
tionalism and violence to advance their struggles.
Random violence that invokes public fear and kills
unsuspecting civilians is one response to exclusion and
marginalization. Such militarized violence characterizes
the LTTE's bombing of public places and people during
the mid-to-late 1990s. More recently, in 2006, targeted
attacks by the UITE resumed, as did violent expressions
of Sinhala chauvinism against Thmils. The Sri Lankan
army and police have also been responsible for a litany of
abductions, deaths, and other human rights violations,
especially in the Eastern Province, since the war began in
1983. These acts of violence have fueled oppositional
nationalist movements on both sides of the majoriry
Sinhala/minority Tamil divide. Militartzed nationalism,
whether Thmil or Sinhala, is about spatialtzing fear.
Under Siege: Home and Native Land
Alison Mountz (2003, forthcoming) and William
Walters (2004) argue that security measures transcend
the political borders of any single nation-state; such
measures are organized increasingly on a transnational
basis. Mountz shows how the state operates far beyond
its territorial borders through airline carrier sanctions,
offshore screening of passengers by airline liaison officers,
and visa restrictions to exclude asylum seekers and other
migrants. Walters introduces the complementary con-
cept of "domopolitics" to suggest the central place of the
home (domus) in geopolitical discourse:
Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the relations berween
citizenship, state, and territory. At its heart is a fateful
conjunction of home, land and security. It rationalizes a series
of security measures in the name of a particular conception
of home. . . . The home as hearth . . . as oLff place, where
we belong naturally . . . home as a place we must protect.
-(\Talters 2004, Z4I)
Home is rendered as a secure, reassuring place charac-
terized by trust, togerherness, and familiarity. By deft-
nition, people from unknown places must be invited
"home." A bifurcated sense of security, represented as
both prosperity (economic) and risk (political), requires
different treatments on the part of the state. Discourses
of neoliberal globalization are not inconsistent with state
discourses of securitization: let in skilled, elite migranrs
but keep the suspicious, uninvited ones at bay. This is
what Matt Sparke calls "securitized nationalism . . . the
cultural-political forces that lead to the imaginirg, sur-
veilling and policing of the nation-sr?re in especially
exclusionary but economically discerning ways" (Sparke
7006, 153). The endangerment trope of invasion pro-
duces fear and is underwritten by securitizationl ? goV-
ernmentality based on mistrust and fear of the uninvited
other (Bigo 7002).
The securitization of fear is a politically powerful re-
source for states that need legitimate grounds for
extraordinary measures, such as violent exclusion from
their territories. Yet "government practices of border
control do not simply defend the 'inside' from the rhrears
'outside,' but continually produce our sense of the in-
siders and outsiders in the global political economy"
(Amoore and de Goede 2005, 168). The securirtzed
nationalism Sparke identifies, the discursive distance it
produces, and its implied boundary between "us" and
"them" represent a deeply geographical problem that
allows fear to be fostered and to fester if left unchal-
lenged. Both the ethno-nationalisms of Sri Lanka and
the securittzed nationalism of home are militarized
geopolitical projects that spatialize fear in specific ways.
After a note on Sri Lanka's political context, the re-
mainder of the ardcle examines two ways in which fear is
deployed in spatially strategic ways in the Sri Lankan
context: fi.rst, through an evolving government policy of
"buffer zones," and, second, through the use of fear in
creating a kind of domo-narionalism in the global North
that promotes particular geographies of aid. I contend
that the buffer zones have exacerbated feelings of
discrimination and nationalism along the coasts of Sri
Lanka, fueling tensions and conflict in the country and
that international aid to Sri Lanka is both an antecedent
to conflict in the country and a tool for managing the
risk of such conflict spilling over into donor countries.
Both cases show how fear is produced by and through
specific political geographies of insecurity.
The Sri Lankan Political Landscape
Two k y moments of political geography begin to il-
lustrate the relations of fear and mistrust among particular
sectors of Sri Lankan society. First, on 23 J,rly 1983,
members of the ITTE ambushed an army patrol on the
Jaffna Peninsula, a predominantly Thmil area, and killed
thirteen soldiers. In the hours that followed, government
troops in Jaffna took revenge and killed fifty-one unarmed
Tamil civilians (Swamy 1996). In Colombo the next duy
the govemment decided to publish, broadcast, and tele-
vise the news about thirteen soldiers being killed by the
LTTE (aka Tamil Tigers) while blacking out news about
reprisals by the armed forces. By 75 J,rly, anti-Thmil vio-
lence had spread throughout the city, enabled by the
government's decision and by the police who largely stood
by and witnessed the looting of Tamil businesses, murder
of Tamil civilians, and widespread displacement of Tamil
residents in the capital.
Later, in 1990, more than three hundred Muslim men
and boys were prostrate in prayer at the Meera Jumma
Mosque when a power cut threw the mosque into
darkness and ITTE cadres opened fire and killed 140
men and boys, shooting most of them in the back. In
Eravur two weeks later another 1,73 Muslim men,
women, and children were murdered in an effort to
ethnically cleanse Muslims from Tiger-controlled terri-
tory or at a minimum displace them from their homes to
shanry villages along the beach, between lagoon and sea
(Ismail 1995).
The war in Sri Lanka has been characterized as one of
violent competing nationalisms between the LTTE and
the Government of Sri Lanka's armed forces since the
pogroms of 1983 (Jayawardena and de Alwis 1996). But
Sri Lanka's present is an expression of a long history and
geography of struggle well-documented by Sri Lankan and
Sri Lankanist scholars (Abeysekera and Gunasrnghe L987;
Spencer L99A; Jeganathan and Ismail 1995; Thiruchelvam
1996). The conflict has spawned large-scale displacement
within the country and well beyond its borders, where a
signiftcant Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora has emerged from
this country of just under twenty million people (Daniel
1997; Fuglerud 1999). The death toll as a result of the
conflict exceeds sixty-five thousand people.
In February 7007, a ceasefire was signed, allowing the
economy to be rebuilt and enabling the LTTE to engage
with the government and wider society as a political
entity rather than as a separatist movement or "terrorist
organization" ( J. Perera 2005). In June 7003, with the
prospect of peace ripe in the minds of international
donors, a conference was held in Tokyo to fi.nance the
reconstruction of war-torn sri Lanka, at which us$4.5
billion was pledged for the "Regaining Sri Lanka" srrat-
egy. The ITTE did not attend the conference, which
aimed to provide financial incentives to peace. Much of
this funding was held back because the government and
LTTE could not agree on how to distribute the funds.
Resolving governance issues between these federal-pro-
vincial scales has become one of the most pressing issues
in both the pre- and post-tsunami period. Plentiful in-
ternational aid begs the question of ho*, by whom, and
on what it should be spent.
Ceasefire violations escalated in 7004 and political
assassinations reached a critical peak in 2001 After
buffer zones were implemented early in 200| tsunami
reconstruction has taken place alongside and in concert
with rising political tensions among ethnic groups and
bipartisan party politics. More than a thousand people
were killed in 2006, including an unprecedented attack
on seventeen staff working for an international relief
organization who were murdered en masse in August
(Apps 7006).
The Case of the Buffer Zones in
Post-Gunarni Sri Lanka
\7hen the buffer zone made i$ entrance after the waves
had left behind the desrrucrion [in January 2005], ir was
known by another name, less popular-set back zone. It
most certainly has lived up to that title.
-Amantha Perera, "The Buffer Zone Fiasco," 2005
In Janu ary 7005 the Sri Lankan Cabinet of Ministers
legislated buffer zones ostensibly as a public safety
measure against the potential devastation of another
tsunami (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2005; Jansz
7005). In the densely populated South, dominated by 
"Sinhala majority and international tourism, o 1O0-meter
buffer zone was established. In the Thmil- and Muslim-
dominated Eastern Province, where tsunami-related
devastation and damage proved greatest, a 200-meter
buffer zone was declared. In both areas, the high density
of population and scarcity of land made the setbacks
highly contentious. At the dme, the Opposition noted
that Clause 14 of the Sri Lankan constitution guarantees
people the right to live in areas of their choice. The
Opposition said it would rescind the buffer zone r€-
quirement if elected to poweq immediately politicizing
the apparently arbitrary buffer zone decision (Tissera
2005). The buffer zones created contested political
spaces characterized by pol anzed party politics, and an
"opportunity to fish for votes" (d. Alwis 2005). Land
within any buffer zone could still be used for business
purposes, a particularly important concession for tourist
operators in Sinhala-dominated beach areas of southern
Sri Lanka (MONLAR and ANRHR 2005). Op.rators of
beach hotels that were damaged but not destroyed by
the tsunami could and quickly did restore their proper-
ties and continue business as usual.
Creation of these "no build" areas was intended to
move people's residences away from the coast in an effort
to prevent deaths should another tsunami occur; how-
ever, no research, rationale, or examples of how this
approach would work or had fared elsewhere were pro-
vided at the time of their introduction. As the Institute
for Policy Studies (2005) in Colombo stated, if public
safety was the prevailing aim, the buffer zones should
have been equivalent for all areas. No explanation was
offered that speciftc environmental, social, and physical
characteristics of coastlines in different parts of the
country ostensibly required responses tailored to those
geographies. Instead, Sri Lanka's \7orld Bank represen-
tative, Peter Harrold, has noted that buffer zones have
been the single greatest barrier to progress in housing
reconstruction for those who lost their homes in the
tsunami (cited in Dias 7006). For those who had lost
family members and their homes, the prospect of losing
their property and places of work (many were fishers) to
no-build zones was a highly unpopular decision, creating
even more uncertainty in the wake of the disaster. This
apparent geographical "fi"x" served instead to fan the
flames of political controversy between the major
political parties and among the various ethno-national
groups that constitute the Sri Lankan populace, namely
Sinhala, Thmil, and Muslim groups.
The President's Office announced that the govern-
ment would identify lands closest to the affected villages
and build a house for "every affected house owner who
lived within the said 100 metres" (Sambandan 2005). It
specified that any owner of a home within the 100-meter
zone "will retain the ownership of his original land" and
the government l'will not in any way claim ownership to
such property." Moreover, the owner would be "entitled
to appropriate the land (within the 100-metre -zone) as
he wishes, except building on it." The government
would "extend patronage to planting coconut or any
other suitable crop in those lands" (Sambandan 7005).
In June 2005, a poll of those displaced from these areas
showed that 65 percent shunned the idea of the buffer
zone (Kangararachchi and Range 2005). In the North
and Northeast, a 400-meter buffer zone was declared bv
the LTTE, an assertion of its declared sovereignry in
those areas fleyeraj 2005).
Because so much more land was rendered "out of
bounds" in the Eastern Province compared to the Sinhala-
dominated South, those displaced by the tsunami in the
East, the minority Thmils and Muslims, claimed discrimi-
nation by the Sinhala-dominated government. Fishers
staged several protests against the govemment's edict
(Associated Press 2005). Through the buffer zone legis-
lation, narrow strips of land benveen the sea and lagoons,
called littoral, or eluvanlural in Thmil, and once home to
separate Muslim and Thmil villages, were declared
"unlivable" by the government. The hinterland, or
paluvaanl<nral, inland from (and wesr o0 the lagoon is
occupied largely by Sinhalese persons resetrled there by
government colonization schemes during the more n&-
tionalist periods of the 1950s and 1970s (feyeraj 2005),
making it less hospitable to Tamils and Muslims displaced
from the coast. In the town of Kalmunai, Ampara District,
where damage was assessed as the worst, L35,000 people
were packed into seven square kilometers; about 4,000
of them died in the tsunami. The most intransigent re-
settlement problem has been where to put the tsunami-
displaced, even on a temporary basis. In Ampara District,
land is most scarce, populadon most dense, and human
displacement most acute in the post-tsunami period
(Institute for Policy Studies 2005).
The zones served to displace yet again those dispos-
sessed by the tsunami and to reproduce patterns of ap-
parent discrimination against minoriry Thmils and
Muslims. Many of those displaced by the tsunami in the
hardest hit eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara
had already been displaced by the conflict, in some cases
repeatedly, to makeshift seaside homes that were swept
away by the tidal waves. Ironically, the dramatic dis-
possession caused by the tsunami brought ro light the
endemic displacement of so many members of these
communities forced to move to seaside locations to es-
cape the war (Grundy-'W'arr and Sidaway 2006). The
war, the tsunarni, and the buffer zone response each
constitute a layer, or moment, of displacement for those
in these two eastern districts.
Not only did the government generate fears that
Muslims and Tamils were being discriminated against
in terms of lost land and rcunami aid, it mobilized fear
of another tsunami to gain support for its legislation.
On 78 March 7005, 8r earthquake near the epicenrer
of the tsunami registered 8.7 on the Richter scale.
Then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga stated that the
mere occurrence of the earthquake (which did not cre-
ate a tsunami) was a logical rationale for the buffer zone:
"the people now should rcaLtze that the government,
bearing in mind all allegations leveled against it, has
acted prudently with a vision and in a responsible
manner" (Associated Press 2005). Soon after, an op-
position MP and former minister, Ravi Karunanayake,
retorted that in his riding of Crows Island 1,500 National
Housing Development Authority houses went under-
water in the tsunarni, despite the fact that they were
situated more than 100 meters from the shoreline-
proo{ he said, that the buffer zone would be ineffectual.
\7hile the initial conception of 100-m and 200-m
buffer zones (and 400-m in LTTE-controlled areas) r€-
mained politically and scientifically suspect, the govern-
ment of President Chandrika Kumaratunga adamantly
maintained the policy for almost a year, though it referred
it to a body of forelgn experts for consultation (Femando
2005). Cracks in the government line only began to show
late in her presidency, in October 7005, when the
Advisory Council of the Coast Conservation Department
approved exemptions from the buffer zone policy (Cassim
7005). Although most criticism of the buffer zones was
homegrown (de Alwis 2005), some observers attribute the
shift toward exemptions to former President Clintor{s
assessment during a May 2005 visit to Sri Lanka that the
buffer zones were impractical. As one journalist wrote, it
"was after the Clinton remarks that the government woke
up to reality" (A. Perera 7005). In November 7005,
Sri Lanka elected a new president, Mahinda Rajapske,
from the sarne political party as the former president,
Chandrika Kumaratunga.
After his elecdon, the new president changed the name
of his predecessor's tsunami response body from the Task
Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) to the Recon-
struction and Development Agency (RADA). In February
2006 RADA announced in an ad in the Smday Times that
the buffer zone "set back standards" would be relaxed and
retrofitted to follow the Coastal Zone Management Plan
of 1997 (RADA 7006).' The Coastal Zone Management
Plan adopted bV the Sri Lankan government in 1997 had
not been enforced given the widespread displacement
of people by conflict to coastal areas in the East. The plan
allows for setbacks of 35-L75 meters from the high
tide watermark. Given the Plan's existence prior to
the tsunami and its environmental safeguards couched in
a scientific rationale, setbacks that appear to correspond
to specific local conditions are less politicized than their
predecessors. Revised and more lenient buffer zones
remain in place throughout the country delaying the re-
construction of replacement homes until land on which to
build can be found and allocated (Centre for Policy
Altematives 2005).
A preliminary study of security in temporary shelter
encampments on the east coast suggests that fear for
personal safety is prevalent among residents. Precarious
geographies of trust and relative peace before the tsu-
nami appear to have been replaced with new community
formations and the unfamiliar faces of those who are
often searched and questioned about their identity
(Hyndman 7006).3 The temporariness of their shelter is
also in question, as the vast majority of those who lost
their homes in the buffer zones have yet to have new ones
allocated to them (Centre for Policy Alternarives 2005).
The buffer zones have created spaces of fear and
mistrust around which parry politics and nationalist
tensions are organized. Fear of another rcunami has been
used to legitimate buffer zones, and now-extant con-
servation guidelines are being used as a more scientific
marker of setbacks. The setbacks, literal and figurative,
have generated uncertainty and hopelessness regarding
the reconstruction of permanent homes. Measures im-
plemented in the name of public safety have had pre-
cisely the opposite effect, generating communal tensions,
personal insecurity, and everyday fear among those in
temporary accommodations in the Eastern Province.
The Geopolitics of Conflict and Aid
It is a conviction of the times, this compulsion to hear how it
tTV newsl stands with the world, and be joined ro the
generaliry, to a community of anxiery . . . a different scale of
news value has been set by monstrous and spectacular scenes.
-Ian MacEwan, Satu,doy, 2005
Cultures of domination rely on the cultivation of fear as a
way to ensure obedience. . . . As a culture we are obsessed
with the notion of safery 
elr hooks, Ail About, r-ove,zooo
Fear is a powerful emotion and tool mobilized ro
achieve various outcomes, political and otherwise. The
securitization of fear involves the rehearsal of looming
threats and invasion, particularly in the register of affect,
to strategically shift political supporr for stare policies
and measures. Speaking of the u.S. role in Iraq,
O Tirathail (2003, 85?) asserts that "rhe world's mosr
powerful military today is led by a cabal of resrless r1&-
tionalists immersed in an anti-intellectual culture of af-
fect and aggressive militarism." He reiterates William
Connelly's argument that human thoughr is not merely
representational but also "enactive" as affect (Connelly
2007). Affect, not just argument, shapes political life.
Development as Security
Concerns about survival, security, and sovereignty are
intimately linked to the producdon of fear ar multiple
scales: of individual property owners, of minority oo-
tional or ethnic groups, of states that see themselves
under siege. Fear is also used to set in motion political
demands for protection from often ill-defined, geo-
graphicafly diffuse threats: disease, asylum seekers,
transnational crime, terrorisffi, all ostensibly linked
through a global web of risk. Individual srates may
recognize shared insecurity and join forces on disease
prevention, border protection, asylum policy, and intel-
ligence related to transnational criminal acdvity.
Immigration regulations and border conffols are
among the most common sites of "securitization," but
foreign policy and development aid have also become
fertile ground for cultivatin g fear about the proliferation
of conflict and its consequences in governments of the
Global South. The United States, Britain, Canada, and
the Netherlands have integrated development aid with
foreign policy through this security discourse, coupling it
with concern that aid be given where it can be most
effective. Ultimately, these donor countries argue, aid
effectiveness relies on political stabiliry good governance
(low levels of corruption being one indicator), and
neoliberal economic policies. Ironically, at the orher end
of the migration spectrum, fear of poor migrants arriving
uninvited and leaning too heavily on their precarious
welfare states is a major concem for these same donor
countries, particularly in Europe where publicly-funded
services and infrastructure have historically been more
generous. The integrated development and humanitar-
ian assistance has become a de facto political tool for
engaging countries that are not strategic to donors in
terms of foreign policy or trade, but that may prove
potentially threatening to donor states without inter-
vention (see the discussion paper of the Canadian
International Development Agency: CIDA 2001).
On a more hopeful note, insecurity can instigate
political will to address the social and economic dispar-
ities that lead to conflict. In their analysis of aid policy
developments in Britain, David Slater and Morag Bell
examine the 2000 White Paper of the Department for
International Development (DFID) : "there can be no
secure future for any of us-wherever we live-unless
we promote greater global social justice" (Slater and Bell
2007, 347). For the political constituency that once
believed overseas development funds could be better
spent at horne, this ffope denies and defies the geo-
graphical separation of "here" and "there," albeit in a
politically retrograde manner. The "distinction between
domestic and international policy is increasingly blurred"
(Slater and Bell 2002, 347). Foreign aid and develop-
ment assistance to address material inequalities and
political abuses are "for our own good," the well-being of
donor societies.
In a similar if more fearmongering vein, Canadian aid
policy documents rehearse related tropes:
Interdependence means that there is a convergence of in-
terests among states around a wide array of issues-the
environment, peace and securiry, health and the suppres-
sion of disease, economic and financial stability, migration
and transnational crime. All states have interests in these
i55ug5-which can also have a strong values base-and
advancing these interests requires, to a growing extent,
improved international cooperation.
-(CIDA 200r, 4)
In short, "Canada's border is long and open to both
commerce and people. Since disease does not need a visa,
we cannot be healthy in an unhealthy world" (CIDA
2001 , 6). Health and well-belng ar home demand inrer-
national cooperation with other states. Foreign policy,
including aid flows, can manage these geopolitical threats.
The mobilizatlon of fears that the "Third \Uorld"
might leak into the "First \World" has become D cofir-
pelling way to frarne development assistance as foreign
policy and a securiry issue. Since aid policy in Canada
became linked in 2000 to security marrers and foreign
policy, development aid has increased 8 percenr per year.
Insecurity is expressed at different scales and from
multiple perspectives: migrants, for example, at once fear
the states at whose borders they arrive and yet embody
insecurity in the imagination of those same states
(Mountz 2004). But as Gregory Q004, ZB) asks, "how
did those imaginative geographies solidify architecrures
of enmiry that contrived to set people in some places
against people in other places?" How are vulnerabiliry
and fear used to underwrite hate and violencel More
hopefully, how can it be diffused and taken apart before
it does its desffuction?
With some exceptions, few geographers have examined
aid policy as foreign pohcy. And yer the implications of
these new ties between aid and securiry usher in a distinct
geographical imagination and constellation of geopolitics.
Increasi"glv, donor agencies align humanitarian and de-
velopment assistance with issues of (in)security and
(in)stabiliry (Macrae and Leader 2000). Threats produce
fear; fear produces a political willingness ro act or acqui-
esce to policies and practices that mrghr nor otherwise be
acceptable, a securitization of fear.
An often-unstated role of development agencies is to
manage risk associated with developing counrries (") by
providing development aid where it will stabilize a
developing country and increase its economic growth, or
ostensibly (b) by withholding aid to "rogue" states until
they come into line with donors' criteria for aid. By
making development assistance conditional on "good
governance" in recipient countries, donors can indirectly
address geopolitical threats. 'Westem states essentially
establish their own political model as a prerequisite for
obtaining assistance, which is then used to address foreign
policy concerns.4 Risk appears to be managed on the one
hand through neoliberal policies of aid and trade that
engender security and prosperity and on the other through
policies of securitization built on tropes of threat that
inculcate fear. As Didier Bigo (7007, 63) has argued,
"expansion of what security is taken to include effectively
results in a convergence between the meaning of inter-
national and internal security." Evoking fears at home of
"over there" through a state-sponsored nationalism is
politically persuasive. Fear and insecurity are linked across
scales, from the bodies of migrants who represent inse-
curity in the imagination of states to the bifurcated
transnational networks of biopolitical surveillance (Sparke
2006). Fear creates a crisis in search of a response.
Aid and the Gunami: "The Difference between AD
and BC"
The geopolitics of international aid to the tsunami-
affected countries of the Indian Ocean Basin vary im-
mensely across the region. Geographers of diverse
backgrounds have had much to say about tsunamis and
their impact (see, among others, Glassman 7005
Lawson 2005; Marston 7005; Nah and Bunnell 2005;
Seager 2006; Le Billon and 'Waizenegger 2006). In the
Sri Lankan context, there is evidence that the $unami
shaped aid disbursements and practices, in some cases
dramatically. I briefly refer to the case of Canadian aid
and decisions around its distribution after the tsunami
because they illustrate more hopeful transnational
geographies of aid and geopolidcs.
The tsunami underscored the geopolitical value of Sri
Lanka to Canada during a time when Canada was
preparing to phase out foreign assistance to Sri Lanka. In
interviews during June 7007 with senior managers at
the Canadian International Development Agency in
Ottawa, I was told that Sri Lanka would be cut from the
Canadian aid map during CIDAs reorganization and
reduction of aid recipients. Sri Lanka's human devel-
opment indicators were considered too high, with the
best gender equality indicators in the region and less
acute poverty than its Pakistani, Indian, and Afghan
neighbors (Interviews 17 and 13, 7A02s). By 7005 the
geopolitical climate for Canadian aid ro Sri Lanka was
transformed: "The tsunami changes everythirg," said
the then Canadian High Comrnissioner for Sri Lanka in
Colombo. She asserted unequivocally that Canada was
not leaving Sri Lanka in terms of bilateral aid, technical
assistance, or knowledg. ffansfers, and noted that the
post-tsunami visit of Prime Minister Martin in January
2005 cemented Canada's and CIDAs role for the nexr
decade (Interview ?.5, February 7005). At the CIDA
office in Colombo this sentiment was echoed by rwo
senior program officers who confirmed that the tsunami
put Sri Lanka "on the map." One of them noted that it
could still fall off again but described the "rsunami
effect" as "a difference between BC and AD" (Interview
9, February 7005).6
In April 7005, CIDA released its list of twenry-five
"development partners," the focal point of its bilateral
aid programming for the next five years (CIDA 2005a).
The list is dominated by fourteen very poor African
countries, but also includes the more prosperous though
tsunami-devastated states of Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
CIDA notes that its goal is to concentrate at least
two-thirds of bilateral aid to these twenty-five states by
z0I0 (CIDA 2005b). The reasons for this dramatic shift
in policy remain an open question ripe for further
research, but the political influence of the Sri Lankan
Tamil diaspora is sizeable. Three senior managers in two
Ottawa-based interviews acknowledged that geographies
of immigration and, in particular, the influence of
diasporas in Canada add pressure for continued aid to
places like Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Interview 12, June
7007; Interview 35, July 2005).
The transnational politics of the diaspora are worrhy
of attention because Canada hosts the single largest Sri
Lankan Tamil diaspora in the world (McDowell 1996).
Estimates of the Tamil diaspora in Canada range from
200,000 (\Tayland 7004) to 400,000 (Sriskandarajah
2007), and Toronto is "the city with the largest number
of [Sri Lankan] Tamils in the world" (Cheran 2000,
170). Most Sri Lankan Thmils are concentrated in a
handful of Toronto-&r€& political ridings, leveraging their
political influence among politicians. Toronto has been a
locus of Tamil nationalism and financial support since
refugees and their family members sought asylum in
Canada in the late 1980s (Cheran 2000). The sig-
nificance of this immigration stream cannot be under-
estimated. Between I99l and 2001, Sri Lanka was the
fifth largest source country of immigrants ro Canada
after China, India, the Philippines, and Hong Kong
(Statistics Canada 2001) . The government agency
Citizenship and Immigration Canada reporrs that
from 1998 to 2000, Sri Lanka was the second largest
refugee-sending country to Canada, accounting for
approximately 10 percent of the refugee population in
each of those years (CIC 2001).
The retrograde shock of "white death" after the tsu-
nami, in conjunction with the more constructive
lobbying of the Canadian government by the Sri Lankan
Thmil diaspora, served to heighten the political visibiliry
of Sri Lanka in Canada in the aftermath of the disaster.T
The geopolitics of aid linking Canada to Sri Lanka have
been traced through diasporic patterns of displacement,
forced migration, and political struggle. State-sponsored
nationalism and securittzed fear in defense of "home"
and its imagined boundary between "us" and "thern" are
partially broken down by diasporic struggles to make
"themtt ((ustt during crisis.
Conclusion
Have his anxieties been making a fool of himl k's part of
the new order, this narrowing of mental freedom, of his
right to roam. . . . He suspects he's becoming a dupe, the
willing, febrile consumer of news fodder, opinion, specula-
tion and all of the crumbs the authorities let fall. He's a
docile citizen watching Leviathan grow stronger while he
creeps under its shadow for protection.
-Ian MacEwan, Safurd"ay, 2005
Fear serves many functions as an imperative for aid
policy and a rationale for buffer zones in the wake of a
tsunami. Threats of invasion, whether by refugees, disease,
or transnational crime, are used to underwrite aid policy
and actual flows. Insecuriry drives aid politics in donor
countries by producing a trope that people there will be
safer if they help stabilize conflict and disaster elsewhere.
This article has exposed some examples of geopolitical
uses and abuses of fear in the context of disasteq, conflict,
and displacement. Both the ethno-nationalisms of Sri
Lanka and the securittzed nationalism of home are geo-
political projecm that spatiahze fear in speciftc ways.
Buffer zones and international aid are but two disaster
prevention measures that aim to manage risk in climates
of fear. Just as fear creates grounds for suspicion, it needs
to be treated, both intellectually and politically, with
suspicion. unraveling the antecedents of fear is crucial to
keep governments and other protagonists of nationalism
in check. \X/ithout constant vigilance that probes the
production of fear and crisis, both of these commodities
will be used creatively and sffategically to justify violence
and exclusion. Insecuriry expressed at scales of the body
and household will remain largely effaced if milit afized
nationalisms continue to reproduce geopolitical life as a
matter of nations and states, fear and violence.
International assistance is underwritten by tropes of
risk management, disaster prevention, and the securi-
tization of fear, A transnational geopolitics of diaspora
with antecedents in conflict and forced migration eluci-
dates the consffuctive political persuasion of refugees-
cufil-citizens in their new home. In a more hopeful vein,
fear can be unraveled, discounted, and negotiated to
subvert the fears of the docile citizen. Fear forges vital
connections between the citizens of donor states and re-
cipient ones, whether based on tropes of solidarity-in-ad-
versity or of potential invasion from the global South. But
fear can also be ffansformed into hope where binaries
benveen "us" and "thern" are broken down, in this case by
diasporic publics in the North as well as anri-chauvinist
coalitions in the South.s Aid flows can change where
political support demands it, as in Canada's aid relarions
with Sri Lanka. Beneath the state-centric guises of se,
curitized nationalism (Sparke 2006), illegal migranr crisis
(Mountz, fofthcoming), and domopolitics (\X/alters 2004)
remain spaces of hope and possibility.
Challenging the producdon of fear by stares, muld-
lateral institutions, and militant nationalists is a vital
source of hope and change in an emerging political cli-
mate of mistrust and geographical exclusion (Hyndman
2005). Echoing the words of Nesiah, Nanthikesan, and
Kadirgamar (2005), "In honor of the dead rhen, let us
make this mornent of collective mourning also an op-
portunity to make a commitment to an ethos of plural-
ism, human security and democntization."
In Sri Lanka, the initial arbitrariness of the buffer
zones infused the already precarious politics of ethnicity,
class, and gender with new tensions, generating more
polarization and grounds for conflict. Buffer zones
are underwritten both by fear and a claim to future se-
curity, however unproven. Nanthikesan (2005) cautions
against focusing on the tsunami-affected to the neglect
of those who fled fear of death or persecurion, displaced
by class and ethno-national wars:
Speaking of disasters and those who lost their livelihoods in
the span of a few minutes, we are reminded of the Muslims of
the North who were driven out by the LTTE on few hours
notice. These refugees continue to languish in refugee camps
for over fifteen years without any serious RR [relief and
reconstructionl effort. It will be difficult for these refugees
to understand why everyone around the globe who are trying
to assist their eastem brethren, have paid no attention
to their fate [the] homeless beggar in the sffeers of
Batticaloa may wish she was affected by the Bunami rather
than by sructural poverty that had deprived her livelihood.
The tsunami and its aftermath have produced their own
class fractions, cultural exclusions, and nationalist fears,
none of which serve to mitigate the current conflict.
Climates of fear are, however, made not given. As ge-
ographers, unraveling the ways in which fear is produced
and framed to legitimate violence, provoke communal
tension, and increase the discursive distance between
"here" and "there" exposes grounds for hope.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Vicky Lawson for her fearless
engagement with this manuscript. Matt Sparke, Philippe
Le Billon, Mala de Alwis, and Alison Mountz all pro-
vided insightful comments, as did Annals editors and
referees. Research on which this article is based was
generously supported by the Social Sciences and Hu-
manities Research Council of Canada.
Notes
1. In the Sri Lanka context, another $Z.Z billion was pledged for
tsunami reconstruction at the Kandy Donor Conference in
June 2005 (lnstitute for Policy Studies 2005). Agreemenr
between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the rebel
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on how to spend
aid allocated for tsunami reconstruction is one of the most
pressing issues in the post-tsunami period.
2. The Plan was implemented in 1981 with a mandare for re-
newal every four years. The most recent plan in place at the
time of the tsunami was the 1997 version (Centre for Policy
Alternatives 2005).
3. Much of the research for this article and the 2006 study cited
took place during two visits of approximately one month
each in February 2005 and 2006. In 2005, I worked with
UNICEF post-tsunami to assess sexual and gender-based
violence. In February 2006, fotry interviews with widows and
widowers in Batticaloa and Akkaraipattu were conducted to
ascertain changes in securiry, the gender division of labor,
and marriage practices in the wake of the tsunami.
4. Slater and Bell's (7.002) postcolonial approach to analyzing
development asks, "who are the agents of knowledge, where
are they located, for whom do they speak, how do they
conceptualize, where are the analytical silences, who is being
empowered, and who is being marginahzed!" (339).
5. Interview information is provided in Primary Sources,
following the References.
6. Canadian bilateral aid will continue to be disbursed in the
unusual manner that has charactenzed the past fifteen years,
whereby no Canadian aid is provided directly to the Sri Lankan
Govemment (nor to the LTTE) for their use. Ratheq all bi
lateral funds are distributed through nongovemmental orga-
nizatioru and civil society networks with proven track records.
7. One should not be too optimistic about the coherence and
unity of the Sri Lankan diaspora. In Toronto after the
tsunami, a Thmil language radio station raised funds on the
air to be given to the Canadian Red Cross. UITE represen-
tatives in Toronto let the fundraisers know that their effrorts
to split donations between the Red Cross and their own
fundraising efforts were not welcome. Given the political split
within the LTTE in April 2004 between cadres loyal to LTTE
leader Prabhakaran based in the North and those aligned
with the breakaway faction of General Karuna in the East, as
well as criticism of LTTE racrics (see nore 8), such frag-
mentation in the diaspora is not unexpected.
8. The distinction berween anti-chauvinist politics and anti-
nationalist politics is an important one. Historical grievances
held by Thmils who have experienced systemic discrimination
by the Sinhala-dominated state since independence in 1948
constitute grounds for Tamil nationalism. How to achieve
social justice for Thmils in Sri Lanka remains an open and
deadly question. In August 7006, Kethesh Loganarhan, a
Thmil nationalist who opposed the Tigers' violent methods,
was murdered in his yard. Exactly a year before Loganathan's
death, foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who was the
highest ranking Thmil in govemmenr at the time, was also
killed for being a "Thmil betrayer" (Sengupra 2006). Like-
wise, Neelan Thiruchelvam, a constitutional lawyer and
human rights advocate for Tamils in Sri Lanka, was killed by
an LTTE suicide bomber in his car on his commure ro work
in 1999. The point here is not ro normarively dismiss na-
tionalism and the struggles to which it refers, but to consider
the terms on which injustice, hate, and change are waged. As
Kumari Jayawardena (1986) has argued, narionalism was an
important political moment for Sri Lanka in its anti-colonial
struggle against the British for independence, even if poli-
ticians used nadonalism and state-building as a reason ro
subordinate gender equaliry ar rhe time.
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